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  This paper proposes an Economic Drought Management Index (EDMI) that could assist 
water managers to inter-temporally manage water reservoirs.  The index=s main appeal is that it 
can be easily interpreted and that encompasses in a single number hydrological processes, 
structural constraints, water institutions= rules and the economic benefits of the customers served 
from the supply system. An empirical application of EDMIs is performed for two irrigation 
districts in Andalusia (Southern Spain), that are managed under different institutional 
arrangements.  Results for one district show that the region=s vulnerability to drought could be 
reduced following the interpretation of the EDMIs.  For the other district, the index shows that 
water stocks are managed under nearly optimal criteria. This last result shows that there is an 
efficient level of drought vulnerability, and that increasing supply security levels would result in 




















                                                 
 1  Funds supporting this research come from an European Project Research  titled: Societal and Institutional 
Responses to Climate Change and Climatic Hazards: Managing Flood and Drought Risks (SIRCH). Contract: n. 
ENV4-CT97-0447. 1998-2000. We thank Javier Calatrava and Ignacio Atance for their valuable comments and 
suggestions, and all attendees at the Fondazione Enni Enrico Mattei seminar held in Milan 9-10 February, 2001, 
titled: Socio-economic Assessmens of Climate Change in the Mediterranean: Impacts, Adaptation, and Mitigation 
Co-Benefits. 
 2  Corresponding author  
     Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu. 













      Hydrological or operational droughts occur when water supply systems fail to meet their 
demands. They originate from persistent periods of abnormally low precipitation, but are not 
entirely naturally-induced events  (Tate and Gustard, 2000; Wilhite, 1993). In addition to low 
discharges, water demand behaviour and the criteria with which reservoirs are operated are also at 
the root of the water shortages that societies suffer occasionally.   
   Although water supply systems must accept certain levels of risk of not being able to service all 
its customers (Owen et al., 1997), determining whether water shortages can be avoided, or at least 
mitigated and at what cost,  is of paramount importance to deciding whether project expansions 
should or should not be developed. The literature seeking to explain why water shortages originate 
cross-cuts several scientific fields. Institutionalists  (Bakker et al.,1998; Kenney, 1995; O'Riordian 
and Jordan, 1999; Ostrom, 1990); economists (Lise et al. 2001; Beare et al., 1998; ; Howe and 
Smith, 1994);  modellers (Dudle y and Hearn, 1993; Garrido and Gómez-Ramos, 2000; Garrido et 
al. 2000); geographers (Emel and Roberts, 1995), hydrologists (Harding et al., 1995); sociologists 
(Keenan and Krannich, 1997);  and statisticians (Tarboton, 1995; Hobbs, 1997), among others, 
contribute with alternative and non-exclusive explanations of why societies experience periods of 
water shortages. Some authors associate weak governance capacity to implement risk-reducing 
strategies, with poor law enforcement (Ray and Willians, 1999;del Moral, 1998; Riesco 1998). 
This would suggest that optimised decision support systems are difficult to apply in its fullest 
extent in many real contexts. Another explanation is proposed by Giansante et al., (2002), pointing 
to the divergence between individual groups= and collective=s interests, and the political pressure 
exerted by strong stakeholders, whose power originates from the priority allocation mechanisms 
that are present in most Mediterranean countries (Iglesias et al., 2000).   
   In view of the abundant evidence emphasising the influence of institutions in the magnitude of 
risks imposed by natural events, several authors have proposed alternative institutional 
arrangements to improve the efficiency of water stocks management. Holistic approaches, such as 
the one proposed by Dudley et al. (1998), attempt to comprise in a model environmental and 
commercial values to guide water allocation in highly variable hydrological systems. The 
introduction of the concept of >capacity sharing= is an example that allows different users acquire a 
portfolio of guarantee-graded rights accordingly with their tolerable level of risk (Dudley, 
1992;Alaouze, 1991; Easterling, 1993), although to date no real application is documented. To 
exploit its efficiency properties, >Capacity sharing= requires that users be given tradable water rights 
as well as tradable rights attached to the reservoir storage capacity, which in the eyes of water 
policy reformers may be seen as the privatisation of multiple-use infrastructures.  
   Water markets established under extremely diverse institutional  settings may promote efficient 
allocation among consumptive users within periods (Easter et al, 1998), but whether or not they 
may help reduce society=s vulnerability to operational droughts remains unresolved, as the 
prospects for scarcity losers may worsened in a market setting. As Miller (1996) contends, water 
banking in California and Idaho is promoted only when drought conditions are already in place, a  
     Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu. 
      
strategy followed also by the water law reform in Spain.  Even under liberalised allocation systems 
and prior to the initialisation of trading, a public agency must decide how much water should be 
given in the form of tradable entitlements to the individual rights holders. Hence, irrespective of 
whether or not water rights are tradable, gaining insight into public agencies= performance and 
efficiency measurements should be at least as important as designing market systems.  
   To date, little effort has been made to develop and apply new indices to judge water institutions= 
outcomes and operations based on economic efficiency and performance. It is surprising that 
among the drought indices encountered in the literature (Vogt and Somma, 2000), none 
incorporates economic variables that translate the supply and demand forecasts into costs and 
benefits. Recently Griffin and Mjelde (2000) provided valuations of consumers= preferences for 
different water supply reliability values, adding to previous evaluations reported by Howe et al. 
(1994).   
  This paper attempts to contribute to the literature both in the methodological and the 
empirical strands, expanding previous attempts in the area of operational droughts and storage 
yield analysis (Tase, 1976; Guerrero-Salazar and Yevjevich, 1975, Marsh and Lees, 1985; Marsh 
et al. 1994). First, it develops a new and simple index that conveys information about the economic 
efficiency of the decision rules followed by water managers to inter-temporally manage water 
stocks. We call this index Economic Drought Management Index (EDMI, hereafter), and claim its 
validity to be jointly used with engineering and hydrological indices to support water stock 
management guidelines. EDMI=s main appeal is that it combines in an easily interpretable index 
four key pieces of information: (1) the structural constraints of a supply system based on 
reservoir(s), including storage capacities; (2) the stochastic nature of discharges; (3) the 
institutional rules used to manage reservoirs, as deduced from the historical records; and (4) the 
economic value of agricultural users. Since EDMIs are based on users= shadow values of water, 
they avoid the need to obtain direct measures of their willingness to pay for various reliability 
levels. Because the index=s formulation results from the solution of an optimal control problem, it 
provides the means to judge observed reservoirs= management on economic efficiency grounds and 
infer whether or not such behaviour may or may not suboptimally risky.   
  In this sense, EDMIs can assist water managers conveying them information about the 
economic risks associated with their strategies and the costs of reducing them.  The paper=s 
empirical dimension shows how the EDMIs can be estimated and interpreted for current 
hydrological conditions, taking the Guadalquivir River Basin (South Spain) as the area of study. 
While the scope of the paper is limited to agricultural water uses, it could easily be expanded to 
incorporate any other type of commercial uses as well as any environmental indicator related to the 
magnitude of the water stocks. By focusing in just one category of uses, we reflect the notion of 
use priorities enshrined in the Spanish Water Code and look strictly at farmers= water rights, 
assuming that both environmental uses and higher rank users always enjoy preferential access to 
the available resources. 
  In the paper=s second section, we lay down the theoretical foundations of EDMI and 
discuss how different values of EDMIs should be interpreted. In section three, we briefly describe 
the area of study and the institutions involved in water management. Section four describes the 
empirical steps required to evaluate the EDMIs and apply them to two institutionally different 
situations encountered in the Guadalquivir river basin. In the fifth section we report the results and 
offer several interpretations that hinge on institutional issues and suggest alternative strategies to 
increase water total productivity and provide alternative storage management guidelines. The last 
and sixth section summarises the paper=s main conclusions and suggests further lines of work that 
may improve the understanding of droughts. 
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2. Defining an Economic Drought Management Index 
   In this section,  we develop an optimisation model that represents the stochastic and dynamic 
problem of running a reservoir. Our objective is to derive and propose an index that embodies 
the problem=s optimality conditions and provides reference conditions against which actual and 
observed behaviour of reservoirs= managers can be judged on economic efficiency grounds. 
   Lets consider the most simple case of a risk-neutral agent in charge of running a single 
reservoir  that supplies water to a well defined group of agricultural users. At the beginning of 
any given period t, the agent observes the stock of water in the reservoir, St, and takes a crucial 
decision on how much water, Wt, should be released to service its customer users. This decision 
leads to an immediate reward F(Wt) that represents the benefits derived from the use of water in 
irrigation. Function F is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable with  0 and  0. 
Clearly, this action affects future benefits, since it also determines how much water is left in the 
reservoir for future uses to confront the possibility of a future drought. 
   We consider that the state of the reservoir follows a controlled Markovian probability law 
given by  0, where Rt is a random variable that represents water discharges  filling the 
reservoir during period t. We assume that this stochastic variable is time independent and 
identically distributed over time. 
   The state transition function is defined as: 
    0    (1) 
   Where Sk represents the maximum water stock that can be held at the reservoir to observe the 
reservoir flood prevention security threshold. 
   The problem faced by the agent can be stated as a discrete time Markov decision process with 
state space  0, where the objective is to seek a state-contingent water releasing policy   0 
that maximizes the present value of current and expected agricultural benefits from water use.  
    0 (2) 
   subject to the state transition equation given by (1) and  the obvious constraint that states that 
releases must be less than or equal to the reservoir stock:  
    0   (3) 
   Assuming  0 sufficiently large, the non negativity constraints, St>0 and Wt>0, will not be 
binding at an optimal solution and the shadow price of water will satisfy the Euler equilibrium 
conditions. 
   Applying the Bellman´s Optimality Principle to this particular case yields the value function 
that denotes the maximum attainable sum of current and expected benefits for given initial 
conditions at the reservoir. 
    0   (4) 
   where  0 if  0, and  0 if   0  
   and where ER represents the expectations operator over future benefits subject to the 
stochastic discharges Rt  entering the reservoir. As we are dealing with an autonomous infinite  
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horizon problem, we can drop the time subscript from equation and denote the value function 
as solely dependent on the initial conditions of the reservoir S0=Si.  
    0   (5) 
   Since the discount factor is bounded,  0, the mapping underlying Bellman=s equation is a 
strong contraction on the space of bounded continuous functions and, thus, by the Contraction 
Mapping Theorem, will possess an unique solution.   
   Characterizing the solution via its equilibrium conditions, the so-called Euler conditions, 
involves the derivative of the value function  0 and provides an intertemporal arbitrage 
interpretation that helps to understand the essential dynamic features of the optimal water 
releasing problem.  
   We apply the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition and the Envelope Theorem to the Bellman 
recursive equation and get that an optimal state contingent water releasing policy must meet the 
following first order necessary conditions (Miranda and Fackler, 2001): 
    0    (6) 
    0      (7) 
   Equation (7) states that when µ=0 (W(Si)<Si), the present value of one additional unit of 
water released today should  be equal to its expected value when left in stock one year ahead.  
Equation (8) states that the present value of one additional unit in the initial stock today should 
be equal to its expected value when left in stock one year ahead.   
   Deriving the state transition equation given by (1), we get that for this particular case:  0 
   Substituting this result and rearranging terms, we can rewrite the previous equilibrium 
condition in (6) as: 
    0      (8)   
   From (8) and (7), it is straight forward that: 
      0          ( 9 )  
   Multiplying by  0  and taking expectations on both sides of equation (8), we obtain: 
      0             ( 1 0 )  
   substituting this expression in (7), results in: 
    0    (11) 
   This equation captures the essential problem faced by a dynamically optimising manager: the 
need to optimally balance immediate certain benefits against expected future benefits. The left 
hand side of this equation represents the current marginal value of the water released to 
irrigation uses and can be interpreted as the cost of leaving one more unit of water in the 
reservoir or the marginal cost of reducing the risk of drought.  The first term in the right hand 
side represents the expected marginal value of leaving one more unit of water in the reservoir 
for next period. It can be interpreted as the marginal benefit of reducing the risk of drought. 
The second term in the right hand side µ takes a positive value when W(Si)=Si, that is, when all  
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available water in the reservoir has already been released.  
   Thus, this optimality rule states that the present marginal value of the water released must be 
equal (when W(Si)<Si) or larger (when W(Si)=Si) than the expected marginal value of leaving 
one more unit in the reservoir. 
   Now, consider a realistic case of a water supply system that is managed with a water 
releasing rule W(Si) that either exists in an explicit form, or at least can be observed from the 
responsible agent=s actual or past behaviour. Using equation (1) that describes the dynamics of 
the reservoir together with a known distribution of the stochastic water inflows that enter the 
reservoir, we can build the markovian transition probability matrix P with elements Pij that 
represent the probability of jumping from initial state Si to a final state Sj, where i = 1,Y,n and j 
= 1,Y,n,  respectively, represent all possible initial and final states of the reservoir. Each 
element Pij of the transition matrix P is denoted as: 
    0   
   Taking into account that gw=1 when Sj<Sk and gw=0 when Sj=Sk, we can compute the 
expected marginal value of water that results from the actual water releasing rule W(Si) as: 
    0  (12) 
   With this result, we make use of the optimality condition in (11) to derive and propose an 
Economic Drought Management Index to test the intertemporal efficiency of actual water 
releasing policy operating in a reservoir system. 
    0  (13) 
   According to the economic interpretation given for equation (11), the EDMI reveals the 
implicit trade-off  between present benefit from last unit of water released from the reservoir 
and future expected benefits that could have been obtained if one more unit would have been 
stocked in the reservoir. Thus, the EDMI can be interpreted as the cost-benefit ratio of reducing 
the risk of drought that results from a given water releasing rule. The application of the EDMI 
to water releasing rules actually operating a reservoir will reveal how efficient are water 
institutions or responsible agents in managing inter-temporally their water storage facilities. 
   The interpretation of EDMI values is quite straight forward. Deviations of the EDMI from 
one will give a measure of  the economic inefficiency of the explicit or implicit rules used to 
supply water to end users. In particular, EDMI values below one provide an indication that 
water institutions may be Atoo risky@ and that the economic costs imposed by hydrological 
droughts may be reduced through a more conservative water releasing policy 
   EDMI values in the vicinity of one reveals that institutions are using efficient inter-temporal 
management criteria. This is because the shadow value of the water released approximately 
equals its future expected benefit. EDMI values higher than one will be signalling that the 
actual cost of marginally reducing the risk of drought is higher than its expected benefit. It has 
to be noted from equation (11) that EDMI values for low stocks, when all water is already 
being released, should be higher than one. 
   Defined as such, EDMI features four properties that makes it appealing for water managers.  
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First, it is unique for any stock value and conveys clear information on the economic costs of 
reducing vulnerability to drought. Second, it coalesces into a single and adimensional number 
information pertaining to reservoir inflows, irrigators= benefits, water managers= criteria and the 
reservoirs storage capacity. Third, one can construct different types of EDMIs. For instance, 
while we have focused on irrigators= benefits to obtain the shadow value, other economic or 
social indicators, such as employment and farmers= net returns, could easily be used to build 
alternative EDMIs based on exactly the same assumptions and quite similar empirical 
modelling. And fourth, its interpretation is simple and based on quite intuitive economic 
reasoning.  
   However, two key assumptions are imposed and must be checked against actual data in order 
to place confidence in the informative capacity of EDMIs. One is the existence and time 
stability of function W(S). No normative conclusions can emerge from EDMIs interpretation 
unless a behavioural pattern is found to be consistent and persistent. The other is whether it is 
possible to represent the dynamic process that govern the transition from Si
 to Sj in a systematic 
and reliable way. 
    
3.  Background of the area of study  
  The Guadalquivir River Basin (GRB) sits in the Southern part of Spain and drains to the 
Atlantic Ocean encompassing an area of 63,240 squared kilometers. Although almost 5 million 
people reside within its boundaries, its water resources have a predominant agricultural use, which 
makes up about 75% of water uses in normal year  (see Table 1). 
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2) 4,430  34,370  12.7 
Population 4,753,689  39,660,000  12 
Pollution
&   20 %  48 %   
  HSource: MIMAM (1998) 
 & Measured as the percentage of flows that are considered eutrophic or hipereutrophic. 
  
  The GRB has suffered three severe droughts in the last 25 years, of which the one that 
occurred during the 1992-95 period is identified as the most severe since 1950.  More than 1,2 
million people faced water service cuts during the 1993 and 1995 summers, and about 200,000 
hectares of irrigated land were left idled during three consecutive years with a loss of 20,000 jobs 
directly linked to irrigated agriculture and of 3.5 to 4 billion Euros of agricultural output. In 
addition, all water quality parameters deteriorated significantly causing unvalued damage in 
riverine ecosystems and natural life (EMASESA, 1997; MIMAM, 1998).   
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 GRB=s water managers are responsible of developing an intertemporal strategy that 
involves deciding how much water is released at a given time, and how much should be stored for 
future consumption.  But as will be explained below, water release decisions result from 
negotiations between authorities, users, stakeholders and other government branches, albeit the 
River Basin Authority=s president will sign the final decision.  In addition to the decision-making 
process, the nature of the water rights and other Water Law provisions impinge on the kinds of 
strategies that competing users can put forward to pursue their interests.  The fact that only a few 
players, representing a large number of users, collide within the boundaries of the River Basin 
Authority, which in turn has a unique voice and presumably acts on behalf of the general 
population, provides the applied context for this paper 
  Two water management systems coexist in the Guadalquivir basin. First is the General 
Regulation System (GRS), which consists of a set of 8 reservoirs centrally managed by the River 
Basin Authority (RBA). The total capacity of this system has been expanded over time as new 
dams were erected, and its present storing capacity is about 4 billion cubic meters.  An irrigated 
acreage of about 200,000 hectares depends annually on the water supply that originates from the 
pool of resources stored in the GRS. In addition to irrigation, the GRS provides other services such 
as flood control, hydropower, urban supply security levels and water quality upgrading. In normal 
circumstances, no other consumptive users are served from the GRS. The resources and the civil 
works associated with the GRS are managed by the RBA.  
  The second management system operates in smaller projects which serve clearly identified 
groups of users. Although they are predominantly managed by these users= representatives, their 
operations are constraint by general basin security rules and subordinated to the GRS=s emergency 
plans. The legal system recognises these users  >special= water rights, based on historical uses, 
which means that they have preferential access to the resources stored in their system. Central to 
the paper=s analysis is the fact that, within wide binding limits, the water storage facilities are 
managed independently from the RBA. The paper=s empirical contexts are illustrative of these two 
management systemsC which hereafter are referred to as centrally-managed and self-managed C 
and provide distinguishable institutional examples of water stock management. 
  A number of common features and rules apply to both case studies= irrigators. Users must 
have water rights to make use of the assigned volumes or flows. Each user=s annual allowance is 
based on the face value expressed in the water right, but is often set at a lower level. Before 1999, 
right-holders were not allowed to sell or lease their water rights, but after the inception of the water 
law reform right-holders will be allowed to exchange their rights.  The reasons to cut down water 
rights vary across institutional arrangements. In the self-managed case, farmers= allowances for a 
given season are set by the users= association which ponders factors such as the state of the 
reservoir prior to the beginning of the season. In the centrally-managed case, the RBA sets farmers= 
allowances  for tens of districts based on the state of the reservoirs in the supply system and taking 
into account priority criteria among users. Thus, if the GRS reservoirs are too low, the RBA may 
need to reserve all resources to urban suppliers if their storage systems happen to be in a pre-
emergency situation. Under these circumstances, urban water rights are given priority and 
irrigators may be given no water allowance. Note, however, that in both cases the probability of 
experiencing low stock levels, which may or may not warrant low farmers= allowances, results 
from the inter-temporal management criteria applied by their respective water managers. 
  For this empirical application, we have selected two different water supply systems located 
in the Guadalquivir river basin (see Table 2). The first services Bajo Guadalquivir (BG) irrigation 
sector that is located in the low tracts of the basin at sea level.  It comprises a set of  homogeneous 
irrigators, who farm similar land plots, grow almost the same crops and use similar technological 
packages. Small differences are found in the acreage farmers devote to cotton within their 
rotations, and whether or not they use sprinklers to make the water applications during the initial  
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growing stages. Its water supply is conveyed by a canal that diverts water from the main 
Guadalquivir river. Thus, its supply originates from the pool of resources that are stored by the 
GRS=s eight main reservoirs and provides an average of 1.9 billion cubic meters to more than 
200,000 hectares. BG district is taken as an example of central management of water supply 
systems. The second case is the reservoir that supplies El Viar (EV) whose farmers have an almost 
exclusive right on water from the reservoir since the dam was erected in 1949 to provide irrigation 
water to the EV irrigators.  This reservoir is managed by elected representatives of the water users 
association. EV district has been selected to illustrate the economic performance of a self-managed 
supply system. 
Table 2.  Main characteristics of the Guadalquivir two case studies 
Name of district  El Viar (EV)  Bajo  Guadalquivir 
(BG) 
Initial date of operation  1949  1974 
Number of farmers  500  800 
Acreage (ha)  12000  15000 
Max. Allotment (c.m./ ha)  7370  8590 
Institutional arrangement 
Water Supply System 



















 1 Based on the total reservoirs= capacity;  
 2 In the BG case, agricultural demand refers to total acreage served from the GRS, which amounts to 200,000 ha. 
 Source: Iglesias et al. (2000) and (MIMAM 2000)  
 
4. Empirical application 
 
  In order to obtain the EDMI for each management system, we need previous estimation of 
three basic elements: 
  
Irrigators= shadow values 
The reservoirs= management models Wt=W(St) 
The transition probabilities matrix from stock level Si to Stj. 
 
  Estimating the EDMIs for BG supply system is more complex than for EV for two reasons. 
First, EV's acreage and the dam it is serviced from have not been altered since it began to operate. 
By contrast, BG district is serviced from a system of reservoirs that has grown in storage capacity 
in the last decades. Second, while EV's irrigators are the only reservoir's right-holders, the 8-
reservoir system that supplies BG also services many other districts and has typical non-
consumptive demands to meet, such as hydropower, water quality and urban suppliers security 
services. The fact that BG system serves other purposes besides irrigation implies that the storage 
capacity of the system that can be effectively used to manage irrigation water is more restricting 
than the system=s storage capacity. 
 
Estimation of irrigators= shadow value 
  
  Shadow values of irrigation water are based on the results of a mathematical programming  
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model applied to a set of representative farms in  both water irrigation districts. We have modified 
the original model of Varela et al. (1998), developed to analyse the impact of a water pricing 
policy, to simulate in this case farmers= behaviour under a water allotment constraint. The 
modelling technique ensures that a broad scope of farming alternatives are properly simulated and 
includes rigidities caused by permanent crops as well as the possibility to combine surface water 
and groundwater using small pumping sets. The model is calibrated to each representative farm of 
each district under normal and drought conditions.  By simulating a range of water allotments, the 
model generates individual farms= shadow values based on the dual value associated to the water 
availability constraint.  
  
  The following equations represent the demand functions obtained for each irrigation 
districts: 
  0        for BG 
  
  0        for EV 
     
Estimation of the water releasing rules W(Si)  
   
  In the absence of statute or explicit rules that establish guidelines about how reservoirs are 
managed, saving flood prevention and other environmental constraints, the functions Wt=W(St) 
have been elicited from the historical records of each district taking the stock of water in the 
reservoir at the beginning of the period as the explanatory variable. Iglesias et al. (2000) screened 
alternative model specifications, and found that annual farmers= allotments were best fit with a 
quadratic relationship of the stock level measured at the beginning of the season. Regression 
results are reported on Table 3. 
 
 Table 3. Regression results for the functional relation between farmers' allotments and water stock 
levels  






DR)] (t-ratios in parenthesis). 
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 Adjusted  R
2 0.88  0.95 
 F-Stat  81.77  82.26  
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 Durbin-Watson  2.01  1.91  
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Source: Iglesias et al. (2000) 
1The structural dummy was added in view of the fact that farmers= allotments were reduced after t=6 in BG and t=18 in EV. 
 
  
  The estimated functions explain at least 88% percent of the allotment variations and all 
coefficients are significant at a 99% confidence level. These functions are meant to be interpreted 
as observed behavioural relationships between stocks and water supply, and do not imply nor deny 
the existence of operational rules governing each of the analysed systems
1. Note that in BG, the 
model=s curvature  switches when stocks fall below 25%, making negative both the linear and 
quadratic coefficients. This indicates that BG=s water allotments are very rapidly reduced when 
stocks get below 25%. This curvature might be explained by the priority criteria that operate in this 
reservoir system: under drought conditions -when stocks are low-, water releases are reserved for 
urban uses 
 
Estimation of the transition probability matrix  
    
  The transition probability matrix can be obtained from the estimation of equation (1) that 
reproduces the dynamics of the reservoir and the statistical characterisation of the natural 
discharges into both storage systems. Discharges into reservoirs follow stochastic processes that 
result from hydrological phenomena that are largely driven by the rainfall regime. In our model,  
we treat natural discharges (R) as a time independent stochastic variable that fits a distribution 
function, whose parameters can be estimated from the data recorded since the dam became 
operative. In this section, we report the results of the statistical analysis carried out to characterise 
discharge=s distribution function. 
  Because the EV district is supplied by a self-managed single reservoir, its annual discharge 
is much easier to characterise. The statistical tests carried out using 50 annual observations of 
discharge into the EV=s reservoir are best modelled by a gamma distribution
4. 
  By contrast, the resources conveyed to the BG district are abstracted from the main river, 
although its allotments are based on the reserves stored in the reservoirs of the Guadalquivir main 
regulation, as shown in the above regression results. We assume that the BG=s supply originates 
from a virtual reservoir, formed by a set of various reservoirs, that have been sequentially put in 
operation during the last four decades. The characterisation of the variability of discharges is 
hindered by the fact that the storage capacity of the basin has grown in the last decades as new 
dams have been erected and made operative. Thus, unlike our previous case in which a single 
reservoir has served a fix irrigation acreage in the last fifty years, BG=s supply has been served by a 
growing system shared by an increasing number of users.  
  To make the estimation tractable, we have generated a variable of annual discharges, 
defined as the weighted average of each reservoir=s annual run-offs  measured as a percentage of 
the storage capacity of the reservoir its feeds. The weighting coefficients for each year are based on 
the percentage of the capacity of each reservoir with respect to the eight-reservoir system. This 
assumption allowed for a representation of the stochasticity of relative discharges, as a percentage 
of total storage capacity. As before, a gamma distribution function was selected among alternative 
functions, with a 99% significance level (see footnote 4). 
  
                                                 
 3  The reader will note that both functions reach global maxima at 76% and 82% of stock, respectively for 
EV and BG systems. Since stocks are usually below those levels, it does not represent a serious limitation to the use 
of these functions. 
 4  In longer version of the paper we provide the statistical characterisation of discharges.  
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  The estimation of equation (1),  that  captures the specific dynamic features of each supply 
system, was carried out following slightly different procedures. In Viar water allotments represent 
total releases from the reservoir since they are exclusive users. In the BG system, allotments only 
represent a small part of total water releases since there are also other users that are supplied from 
this system. In a longer version of this paper, we provide a detailed description of the estimation of 
each district=s equations. Figures 1 and 2 show that the discrepancies between the projected stock 
levels Busing our estimation of equation (1)- and the actual levels are not very significant. These 







Figure 1: Actual and projected stock levels in BG.      Figure 2: Actual and projected stock levels    in  EV                     
                                                
  
  Based on the discharges= statistical characterisation and the estimated functions W=W(Si), 
we can estimate each element of the  transition probabilities matrix linking stock states Si to Sj. Let 
S=(S1,S2,YS15) represent all possible stock levels in the reservoir.  Assume that at the beginning of 
the season, stock level happens to be Si (I,j=1,...,15), define pij as a generic element of the transition 
probability matrix, representing the probability of reaching Sj at the end of the season. The value of 
pij results from: 
  
0                              [14] 
 
 These  pij can be directly computed from the gamma distributio3n that characterise 
stochastic water discharges. Each element in matrix P provides the probability of moving from one 
initial state (a row) to a final state (a column). It is worth recalling the assumptions that have been 
made to calculate it: (1) behavioural function W(St) exists and exhibits time stability, in the sense 
that the recorded history can be used to elicit current or future behaviour; (2) the dynamics 
governing each system can be confidently  characterised by the parametric versions of equation 
[1], and (3) the statistical characterisation of discharges, based on historical record, is presently 
valid. 
  
5.  Results and discussion 
      EDMI has been evaluated for the water supply systems that service EV and BG irrigation 
districts. The values of the EDMI in each district supply system are reported in Table 4 for the 15 
possible initial state levels, Si, and plotted on figure 6 for comparison purposes. 
   The comparison of EDMI values  reveals that the self-managed supply system follows much 
more efficient inter-temporal water allocation rules than the centrally-managed system.  EDMI 
values obtained for BG display large deviations below the optimal one-value and indicate that 
water managers may be following rather inefficient water releasing rules, assuming  excessive risks 
of drought. From Figure 3, we can observe that when the initial  stock level is in between 76% and 
34% of reservoir capacity, EDMI values sharply drop below the one-value.  
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     According to the interpretation of EDMI, this is an indication that the cost of implementing a 
more conservative strategy would be largely rewarded by the expected benefits resulting from the 
subsequent reduction in drought risk. This finding supports the recommendation that more 
conservative strategies should be implemented and that inter-temporal water allocation rules 
should be more responsive when such initial conditions are observed at the reservoir.  
      When stocks are at relative low levels, below 30%, EDMI values cross the one-value line 
indicating that it is too late to avoid drought impacts. The cost of saving water under such situation 
is already larger than the expected benefits. The sharp change in EDMI values is partly due to the 
pattern followed to release water to the BG  district and its associated marginal value. Water 
managers release very high allotments to BG even when stocks are at 40% of capacity and reduce 
it drastically whenever stock happen to be below 30%. 
    
Table 4. Economic drought management indices (EDMIs) for EV and BG water supply systems 





















13  2.31  2.70  0.41  0.15 
13  0.00 
2.22 0.37  0.67 
16  2.79  2.56  0.38  0.15 
16*  0.51 
2.30 0.36  0.158 
22*  3.67  2.29  0.33  0.14 
22  2.84 
2.07 0.28  0.135 
    2.05  0.28  0.14 
28  4.99 
1.30 0.14  0.109 





0.93 0.08  0.081 





0.21 0.01  0.054 





0.02 0.00  0.031 





0.04 0.00  0.015 





0.09 0.00  0.006 





0.32 0.00  0.002 





0.84 0.00  0.001 





1.09 0.00  0.001 





1.09 0.00  0.001 





1.08 0.00  0.001 





1.12 0.00  0.001  
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*With stocks below these levels, farmers= allotments assigned accordingly with equation [1] empty the reservoirs. 
    
  Figure 3.  EDMIs for EV and BG 
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  This manner of setting farmers= allotments  B resembling an Aall or nothing@ strategy B is  
inefficient and would be in BG farmers interests to replace it by a much smoother trend. For 
instance, when stocks are at 46%, water managers still release large water allotments to BG 
farmers despite the risk of drought is considerably increasing. In this case, EDMI  is 0.02, 
revealing that the cost of saving water is only 2% of the expected value of one more unit of water 
at storage.  The finding that EDMI hits the one-value when stocks are above 76% is equivalent to 
asserting that its supply system is able to secure the complete allotment of farmers for two 
consecutive years, at nearly full probability.  
  The EDMIs for EV portray a widely different situation. EDMI values in this case display 
moderate departures from the one-value and even stay above it for an ample range of possible 
water stock at the beginning of the season, suggesting that water managers follow quite a 
conservative strategy. Given the climate conditions as well as structural and hydrological 
constraints they face, self-managed  managers exhibit  quasi-efficient levels of drought risks. This 
implies that there would be efficiency losses resulting from running the supply system at a lower 
drought vulnerability level. This result partly answers the question raised by Griffin and Mjelde 
(2000) about the costs of deviating from optimal drought vulnerability levels. Only for initial 
stocks around 70% of capacity, the EDMI slightly deviates below the one-value and suggests that 
in this case the risk of drought could be slightly reduced through moderate reductions in water 
allotments when such initial conditions are observed at the reservoir.  
  
  6. Concluding remarks 
  In this paper we have proposed a new index to measure the economic performance of the 
management rules that govern the decisions of water supply systems operating in highly unstable 
climatic patterns. The proposed Economic Drought Management Index (EDMI) combines in a 
single number four sources of information: (1) the structural constraints of a given water supply 
system, (2) the characteristics of the hydrological patterns originating from purely natural 
processes (3) the managers' behavioural rule, elicited from their historical records; and (4) the 
economic benefits accruable on water users.   
  EDMIs have been evaluated for two institutionally different water management systems in 
the Guadalquivir basin (South of Spain) and the results obtained show remarkable differences in 
the performance of these water supply management systems. The estimated EDMI indicate that 
centrally-managed water supply systems seem to display riskier strategies since deviations below 
optimum value are much larger than in the self-managed system. It comes out that the BG supply 
system is failing to spread the hydrological risks, falling short of the possibilities available from  
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their present storing capacity. EDMI values suggest in this case that the economic risk of drought 
could be reduced and significant efficiency gains could be achieved by pursuing a more 
conservative releasing strategy. On the contrary, EDMI for the Viar supply management system 
demonstrates that a conservative releasing strategy is being performed and show that vulnerability 
to drought can not be further reduced in this system without incurring in efficiency losses. 
  While in the empirical application we showed how EDMI can be used to evaluate and 
establish guidelines to improve the actual releasing patterns operating  in different reservoir supply 
systems, other applications of the EDMI are possible. For example, the EDMI could be used to 
assist water managers of a given supply system in comparing the economic efficiency of 
alternative management patterns.  We also suggest that  EDMI may be an useful tool in simulation 
exercises providing guidelines for the adaptation of the actual management patterns to changing 
conditions such as climate change scenarios. 
  This paper adds to the literature on water institutions performance under uncertain natural 
environments proposing an index which can be easily interpreted by water managers and analysts. 
It conveys unambiguous information about the kind of strategies that are desirable under different 
circumstances. We leave for further research other objectives such as finding alternative indices 
that convey social information such as impacts on farm employment, the value of agricultural 
commodities or various non-use water values. 
  
 References 
Alaouze, C.M. 1991. The optimality of capacity sharing in stochastic dynamic programming problems of shared 
reservoir operation. Water Resources Bulletin 27 (3):381-386. 
Bakker, K., T. Downing, and A. Garrido. 1998. A framework for institutional analysis. SIRCH Working Paper Series. 
3. 
Beare, S.C., S.C. Bell, and B.S. Fisher. 1998. Determining the value of water: The role of risk, infrastructure 
constrain, and ownership. American Journal Agriculture Economics 80 (5):916-940. 
Dudley, N.J. 1992. Water allocation by  markets, common property and capacity sharing: companions or 
competitors? Natural Resources Journal 32:757-778. 
Dudley, N.J., A.H. Arthington, B.W. Scott, and J.J. van der Lee. 1998. Integrating environmental and irrigation water 
allocation under uncertainty: Centre for Water Policy Research. 
Dudley, N.J., and A.B. Hearn. 1993. Systems modelling to integrate river valley water supply and irrigation decision 
making under uncertainty. Agricultural Systems 42:3-23. 
Easter, K.W., M.W. Rosegrant, and A. Dinar, eds. 1998. Markets for water: Potential and performance. New York: 
Kluwer Academis Publishers. 
Easterling, W.E. 1993. Assessing the regional consequences of drought: putting the MINK methodology to work on 
today=s problems. In Drought Assessment, Management and Planning: Theory and Case Studies, edited by 
D. A. Wilhite. Boston:  Kluwer Academic Publishers, 49-65. 
EMASESA. 1997. Crónica de una sequía 1992-1995. Seville. 
Emel, J., and R. Roberts. 1995. Institutional form and its effects on environmental change: The case of groundwater 
in the Southern high plains. Annals of the Association of American Geographer 85 (4):664-683. 
Garrido, A., E. Iglesias, and A. Gómez Ramos. 2001. El agua subterránea en la gestión de las sequías. El impacto 
económico de las sequías en la agricultura. Revista de la Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas Físicas y 
Naturales 94 (2):237-248. 
Garrido, A., and A. Gómez -Ramos. 2000. Socio-economics aspects of droughts. In Drought and drought mitigation 
in Europe, edited by Vogt J. and F. Somma. Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 197-209. 
Giansante, C. et al.  2002. Institutional adaptation to changing risk of water scarcity in the lower Guadalquivir Basin. 
Natural Resources Journal. Vol 2 (3).in press for coming.    
Griffin, R.C., and J.M. Mjelde. 2000. Valuing water supply reliability. American Journal Agricultural Economics 
82:414-426. 
Guerrero-Salazar, P. and Yevjevich, V. 1975. Analysis of drought characteristics by the theory of runs, Hydrologic 
Papers 80, Colorado State University, Colorado.     
Harding, B.L., T.B Sangoyomi, and E.A. Payton. 1995. Impacts of a severe sustained drought on Colorado river 
water resources. Water Resources Bulletin 31 (5):815-824.  
     Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu. 
      
Hobbs, B.F. 1997. Bayesian methods for analysing climate change and water resources uncertainties. Journal of 
environmental management 49 (1):53-73. 
Howe, C.W., and M.G. Smith. 1994. The value of water supply reliability in urban water systems. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 26 (1):19-30. 
Iglesias, E., A. Garrido, and A. Gómez-Ramos. 2000. Evaluation of drought management in irrigated areas. Paper 
read at International Conference  of Agricultural Economists, August 2000, at Berlin. 
Keenan, S.P., and R.S. Krannich. 1997. The social context of perceived drought vulnerability. Rural Sociology 62 
(1):69-88. 
Kenney, D.S. 1995. Institutional options for the Colorado river. Water Resources Bulletin 31 (5):837-850. 
Lise, W., A. Garrido, and E. Iglesias. 2001. A game model of farmer=s demand for irrigation water from reservoir in 
Southern Spain.: Risk Decision and Policy Vol. 6: 167-185 
Marsh, T.J. and Lees M.L. 1985. The 1984  (UK) drought. Hydrological Data: UK Series. Institute of 
hydrology/British Geological Survey.   
Marsh, T.J. et al. 1994. The 1988-92 drought. Hydrological Data: UK Series. Institute of hydrology/British 
Geological Survey.   
Miller, K.A. (1996). Water banking to manage supply variability. In The Economics of Economics of Environmental 
Resources.Vol. 1.  Edited by D.C. Hall. London. Jai Press Inc,185-211.  
MIMAM. 1998. El libro Blanco del Agua. Madrid: Ministerio de Medio Ambiente. 
MIMAM. 2000. Plan Hidrológico Nacional. Madrid: Ministerio de Medio Ambiente. 
Miranda, M.J. and P.L. Falcker. 2001. Applied Computational Economics and Finance. The Ohio State University & 
North Carolina State University MIT Press. www. ncsu.edu/-pfacker/compecon/ 
Moral, L. del. 1998. El sistema de abastecimiento de agua de Sevilla: análisis de la situación y alternativas al embalse 
de Melonares. Nueva Cultura del Agua Serie Informes.5. 
O'Riordian, and A. Jordan. 1999. Institutions, climate change and cultural theory: Towards a common analytical 
framework. Global Environmental Change 9:81-93. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The evolution of institution for collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Owen, W.J., T.K. Gates, and M. Flug. 1997. Variability in perceived satisfaction of reservoir management objectives. 
Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 123 (3):147-153. 
Ray, I., and J. Williams. 1999. Evaluation of price policy and water theft. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 81 (4):928-942. 
Riesco, P. 1998. The challenge of climate change for water technologies: an institutional perspective. SIRCH Working 
Paper Series. 
Tarboton, D.G. 1995. Hydrologic scenarios for severe sustained drought in the Southwestern United States. Water 
Resources Bulletin 31 (5):803-814. 
Tate, E.L., and A. Gustard. 1999. Drought definition: an hydrological perspective. In Drought and drought mitigation 
in Europe, J. Vogt and F. Somma (eds). Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 23-49 
Tase, N. 1976. Area-Deficit-Intensity characteristics of droughts. Hydrological Paper 87, Colorado University. 
Varela-Ortega, C., Sumpsi, J.M., Garrido, A., Blanco, M., Iglesias, E., 1998. Water pricing policies, public decision 
making and farmers= response: implications for water policy. Agricultural Economics 19, 193-202.  
Venema, H.D., E.J. Schiller, K. Adamowski, and J.M. Thizy. 1997. A water resources planning response to climate 
change in the Senegal River Basin. Journal of Environmental Management 49 (1):125-155. 
Vogt, J.V. and F.Somma..2000  Drought and drought mitigation in Europe. Advances in Natural and Technological 
Hazard  Research.  Vol. 14. Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publisher  
Wilhite, D.A. 1993. The enigma of drought. In Drought Assessment, Management and Planning: Theory and Case 
Studies, edited by D. A. Wilhite. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Yevjevich, V. 1967. An objective approach to definition and investigations of continental 
hydrologic drought. Hydrological Papers 23, Colorado University   
     Erreur ! Argument de commutateur inconnu. 
      
  
  





      
  




   
  
  
  
  
  